There is a lot of interest in the developments taking place in Germany, internationally, on all levels: The rise of the far right party AfD, the fall of the left party Die Linke, the way Sarah Wackenknecht’s party fared in the recent Euroelections, the economic situation in Germany which is a matter of a lot of discussion about whether it is faced with a long term decline or not, etc. These discussions are taking place both inside ruling class circles and also the Left.
Claus Ludwig is a leading comrade in the German revolutionary socialist organisation Sozialistiche Alternative – SAV. He spoke with comrade Andros Payiatsos.
AP: Hi Claus. Let’s start with the economy. Can you describe the loss of ground by Europe’s economic powerhouse, and how this impacts on the daily lives of working-class people and the youth?
CL: The German economy is squeezed by the “New Cold War” (which is getting definitely hotter) between the West and China. German capitalism was able to make deals with all sides before, buying cheap energy from Russia, selling products to the EU, US and China. The confrontation with Russia contributed to the energy price shock. The ruling class decided to strategically side with the US bloc, risking economic problems. This process is being accelerated by the failure of German capitalists to invest and develop new products. While China was already heavily engaged in developing electric vehicles, German car manufacturers concentrated on falsifying the emission statistics of their diesel engines. E-cars produced in Germany are not competitive to the Chinese cars flooding into Germany. EU sanctioned China with higher import tariffs, Germany had to go along with the EU decision although German car companies fear reprisals against their sales on the Chinese market.
The downturn is being further aggravated by decades of public disinvestment leading to crumbling roads, schools and rail tracks, experienced by Euro championship tourists wondering how “German efficiency” turned into public transport chaos. The chickens come home to roost: the brutal cuts which the German ruling class inflicted on Greece and other countries during the Euro crisis at the beginning of the 2010s now hit the economy of the then “winner country”.
The working class was mainly affected by the cost of living crisis of 2022/23. Inflation calmed down again, but prices are still high, wages haven’t been raised enough to cover for inflation in many sectors. Especially rents, they are still skyrocketing. As Germany is a tenant country with only 45% owning a flat or a house this is a very serious problem.
The destruction of jobs in industry has gained pace since 2022. Since 2018 already 60.000 jobs have been slashed in the automobile sector, experts estimate that 100.000 to 200.000 jobs will be lost in the near future in this sector alone. Unemployment has risen only moderately from 5,3% in 2022 to 6% in 2024. This is due to the overall lack of labor resources in many sectors based on the demographic factor (low birth rate, a huge part of the workforce entering pension age). Many workers losing their jobs still find new employment very soon. But losing a job in the car industry definitely means being paid less in the new job. And the tendency that workers who are made redundant don’t find a job at all, will get stronger.
AP: Given this background, what was the main “message” of the Euroelections of June 9?
CL: There are a number of messages:
1) A deep distrust in the coalition government of Social Democrats, Greens and Liberals.
2) The rise of the right wing populists, AfD (“Alternative for Germany”) achieving 16% overall and becoming the strongest party in all Eastern federal states. As they are extreme and flirting with Nazi vocabulary they are still not accepted by the ruling class as an option to govern (unlike Le Pen, Meloni etc.) but they will move in this direction.
3) The existential crisis of DIE LINKE (“The Left”) which lost all its base in the countryside and the smaller cities in the East where it once was strong and is being reduced to a party of left wing core voters in the bigger cities. The Left especially lost support among unemployed and blue collar workers and is now basing itself on academics, students and some layers of social and health care workers..
4) The rise of a “left conservative” party around and named after Sahra Wagenknecht, former LINKE MP, which combines some propaganda against the rich, the demand for peace with Russia and an anti-establishment attitude with an anti-refugee and anti-feminist position.
AP: What is the dynamic in the present balance of forces after the Euroelections? What perspectives do you see for the coalition government?
CL: We will see federal state elections in three eastern states in September, which will mean a victory for the right wing populists. As the capitalists don’t want to see them into governments at this conjuncture, there will be “Anti-Afd” coalitions formed. In Thuringia there could be a government made of CDU (Conservatives) and the ex-lefts around Wagenknecht. SPD, Greens and Liberals combined will get between 18 and 25% in these elections. DIE LINKE is in danger of missing the 5% threshold in two of three states.
The national coalition government is like a perfect definition of a lame duck. No initiatives, they only administer. But it is unlikely that they call early elections. They can only lose. Most likely they will wait for autumn 2025 (regular elections) and pray for a miracle. The working class has to prepare for a CDU-led government from this election onwards, which will be much to the right compared with the earlier CDU administrations under Merkel and will organize attacks on social services and union rights.
AP: We’d like to know more about the AfD. About its character, its programme and perspectives. What effect does this have on Nazi groups, either inside or outside AdD? How is the Left discussing the growth of AdD?
CL: The AfD is a right wing populist party with a fascist “potential” inside. It changed its leadership four times in the last ten years and went more to the right at every such instance. Some of their leaders, like Hoecke, play with their Nazi image and do verbal provocations from time to time to test the ground. But the AfD hasn’t yet turned to street violence, their methods are still focussed on getting propaganda out and members elected.
Their program is outright contradictory. In a broad sense their official program is still a neoliberal programme. But they send other signals from time to time, emphasizing how the poor suffer, and argue in favor of saving jobs.
In the mid 2010s they didn’t get that many votes from the working class and the poor. The poor wouldn’t vote at all, and the AfD was kind of limited to very conservative layers of workers and petty bourgeois, especially precarious self-employed in the East. That has partly changed. They get votes from broader layers, especially blue collar workers.
They are now the strongest party in all Eastern federal states apart from Berlin. They profited from the massive racist propaganda from 2015 onwards that all established parties pursued. They profited from the alienation during Covid and sank roots amongst the anti-vaxers. And they have boosted their support since the Ukraine war started.
Before Wagenknecht’s break with DIE LINKE, they were the only party openly standing for negotiations and against sanctions, demanding to go on buying cheap Russian gas. This struck a chord especially in the East, where people are more affected economically and where there are more sympathies for Russia and a deeper distrust toward the US. Some of the MPs of the party have close links to Russian and Chinese “institutions” a.k.a. intelligence services. This led to the bizarre situation, that the most aggressive nationalist party has been labeled as “Vaterlandsverraeter” (traitors of the fatherland, a phrase formerly used against the Left) by the established parties.
The open Nazis are marginalized through the growth of AfD. Some of them joined AfD, but many groups try to build independently – something which seems not to be that successful. In Saxony where there is bigger space on the right, the more militant grouping “Free Saxonians”, was able to grow.
It is clear among the Left that the AfD is dangerous. When they get strong parliamentary groups or if they enter government -they got their first mayors elected in 2024- they will push public opinion and official politics to the right, will strengthen racist propaganda and attacks on the Left. The ground for this is being prepared every day by the so-called “democratic parties”: democratic rights are under attack, the freedom of opinion is limited when it comes to the Gaza war, radical climate activists have been hit hard by police violence and court decisions, etc.
But there is also the exaggerated fear of fascism coming to power in a short time. This is not correct; the ruling class does not need fascism in the next years. They need a stable system in which the right wing populists have to be integrated. While it is not wrong to warn against the fascist danger in itself this often leads lefts to accept all kinds of alliances as long as they are directed against the AfD. We have seen the impressive mass movement of more than 2 million marching against the AfD in January and February this year. But it was politically led by the establishment parties which used to talk about the “defense of democracy” not only against the AfD but also against Russia and China. In some cases, pro Palestine protesters were thrown out of the demos.
While we have to be serious about the dangers and complications following the upswing of the AfD the Left shouldn’t join alliances with the establishment parties because they themselves prepare the ground for the growth of the extreme right.
AP: Sarah Wackenknecht created a new party in the name of supposedly blocking the growth to AfD. Is there any basis in such claims? Can you describe the character of this party?
CL: BSW (“Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht”) got votes from all parties, more from SPD, CDU (depending on the federal state) and DIE LINKE than from AfD. Especially ex-LINKE-voters (voters lost in previous elections) turned to Wagenknecht. They partially hindered the growth of AfD but didn’t block it.
The party is strictly controlled by the leadership. Only handpicked members are allowed. They try to create an election machine. Most leading activists come from DIE LINKE, quite many of them from the former left wing. But they sided with ex-SPD members and entrepreneurs. Wagenknecht coined the phrase “left conservative”. Others say they are to the right of the SPD. Christian Leye (ex “Anticapitalist Left”, the current inside DIE LINKE that the Marxists are also involved in) says the right and left are categories which don’t matter today outside the “academic bubble”.
While they raise demands for fair wages and higher taxes for the rich, they develop no criticisms towards capitalism. They even side with the CDU to cut unemployment benefits. Although they are widely seen as being “social” and good for “ordinary people”, they base themselves on an undeveloped dissatisfaction of working people which could be defined as a kind of “raw” or “pre-class” consciousness which contains many openly reactionary ideas.
Given the failure of DIE LINKE to take a principled position on the Ukraine war, the Wagenknecht party is seen as being anti-war and pro-peace, although they have no worked out program. They just warn not to escalate further, stand against armament of Ukraine and call for peace negotiations. But that was enough to boost their election results.
The reformist Left which made some steps forward in the 2010s has –under the blows of capitalism’s multiple crises– developed into two in effect reactionary trends: a “progressive” trend, represented by DIE LINKE, verbally supporting feminism, pro LGBTQ+, antiracism, but siding with the ruling class on all strategic questions – and in practice betray all of its antiracist or feminist positions. This is best seen in Ukraine and Gaza. The other side of the coin is the Wagenknecht party, negating feminism etc. openly, basing themselves on prejudices which exist in the middle classes and parts of the working class.
None of the two show any way forward, but contribute to escalating the disintegration of the Left, which opens up further possibilities for the far right. We, as Marxists, stand against the capitalist class on all issues, especially on the question of war and militarism. We always emphasize the common interests of the working class while fighting special oppression against minorities and against women.
AP: Last but not least. In what state does Die Linke find itself? Are there any developments outside Die Linke, in the “anticapitalist space”?
CL: The party is in disarray. As it is a party focused on elections and parliamentary presence its very existence is threatened by the loss of seats. If there is no sharp change in the objective situation it won’t get into the Bundestag in autumn 2025.
There were hopes that after the departure of Wagenknecht it could work more constructively. But Wagenknecht was only one expression of the crisis. The party was always based on compromise between different trends. This led it to a situation where it is not able to adapt to new situations. While it had a basically correct antiracist position when the refugees came to Germany in 2015 it never understood the danger of the far right and the need to give class based answers to counter their propaganda. The party sided uncritically with the establishment during Covid. The worst failure was the inability to take a clear stand on the Ukraine war. Many prominent figures of DIE LINKE argued to send arms to Ukraine. The official line was against arms delivery, but it was very vague, talking only about Russian aggression, not mentioning the inter-imperialist character of the war. This alienated whole layers.
Today many party activists say the party should focus on “social issues” like housing, should get better in organizing resistance from below, and should learn from the Communist Party of Austria, where elected representatives only get a workers wage. These are correct propositions, but they are not enough. If the party has no clear position on the “big issues” like the war, it will never recover. But such a turn is unlikely. The leadership is not ready to change position and the rank and file is partly helpless. It’s possible the party breaks up after the next general election. But as there exists no alternative on a national level it could hold for a while. Thousands of activists are in the party and they won’t give up completely as they have nowhere else to go. The agony might take some time therefore.
Polarization in society is not mainly along class lines but along ideological lines, about “values” and “culture”. Partly it’s between the liberal way to deal with capitalism’s multiple crises and the far right populist way. This marginalizes the forces of the Left.
The mood in the youth is mixed. The extreme right has been strengthened amongst the youth. There is an anti-climate, anti-feminist backlash especially amongst male young people. Added to this, parts of the youth are impressed by the avalanche of militarist, imperialist propaganda promoted by the media every single day. There are strong “anti-Russian” feelings and a pro Western imperialism support under the “progressive” disguise of the Greens.
However a growing minority is turning to the left, passing by DIE LINKE and getting active in smaller left wing groups. There is a certain revival of Neo-Stalinist and Maoist groups. Trotskyist groups are also growing, although still moderately. More youth are getting active in a broader sense, partly consciously turning towards the organized working class. Some mobilizations like climate demos, 8th of March demos or alternative Prides have become quite big, with anticapitalist slogans dominating. It is very important that this introduces a layer of 16-20 year olds into revolutionary politics, but still there is no new formation looming or a general trend developing. The class struggles are still on a low level although more workers were involved in strikes than in the period before.
