Andrοs Payiatsos
In July and August 2024, we have the anniversaries of the 50 years since July and August 1974, when the coup d’état (July 15), the Turkish invasion (July 20) and second phase of the Turkish invasion (August 14) took place in Cyprus, leading to the division of the island. The main lessons from the history of the Greek-Turkish relations on the island and the stalemate of the last 50 years are drawn out in the following three articles.
Part A: How we arrived at war and partition
The official narrative of the Greek Cypriot and Greek ruling classes, from the outset of the conflict with their Turkish and Turkish Cypriot counterparts, portrays the Greeks as the good guys and the Turks as the bad guys. According to this view, the Greek side is always right, and in all major conflicts, the “barbaric” Turks are to blame. However, for those who support the interests of the working class and the oppressed masses, the main task is to be objective and hold every side accountable for their actions without any trace of nationalism.
For those advocating for the working class and popular strata, the primary duty is to objectively present the true facts about what the ruling classes on all sides have done, devoid of any nationalist bias. Specifically, we must expose the crimes of “our own” ruling class.
This is the only way the Left can fight to ensure that “national questions” do not lead to hatred and wars between workers of different nationalities or nations. Moreover, a class analysis of national questions is the only way to provide solutions to such problems.
The working class movement, through its political and other organizations, is the only force that can have an objective approach to history. In contrast, the ruling class, in order to maintain its power, is “condemned” to falsify history by promoting its own nationalist perspective and ideology.
Misrepresenting History
The latest example of how the history of the Cyprus problem is being misrepresented, is the recent circular published by the Cyprus Ministry of Education, marking the 50th anniversary of the Turkish invasion in 1974. This circular describes in details the brutality of the invasion, including executions, ethnic cleansing and division of the island, but it completely fails to mention a “little detail”: the coup that preceded it.
The reality is that the preceding coup by the Greek Cypriot national guard and the far-right nationalists gave Turkey the justification to invade Cyprus “legally” and “constitutionally.” On July 15, 1974, the Greek junta, along with the far-right- nationalist organization EOKA B, which represented its interests in Cyprus, overthrew the elected government of Archbishop Makarios, the President of Cyprus. Five days later, the Turkish invasion took place. This coup and the subsequent invasion were preceded by nearly two decades of escalating inter-communal tensions and conflicts between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. This historical trajectory is either concealed or misrepresented by official historiography. Throughout this period, crimes and mass murders committed by right-wing Greek Cypriots were concealed, and the perpetrators were never convicted, despite their identities being known in many cases.
Let us start with a glance at the real history of the events that led to 1974.
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots: From cohabitation to EOKA
The Cyprus Act of Independence (Treaty of Guarantee) was signed in 1960, following the Zurich and London agreements of 1959. Cyprus ceased to be a British colony and became an “independent” state. However, it was never truly independent; it was constrained by British colonial influence, as well as by the “mother countries” Greece and Turkey, which had a military presence and exerted direct political interference.
The country’s constitution provided for three guarantor powers: Greece, Britain, and Turkey. By actively taking part in the coup, the Greek side violated the constitution, and Turkey used this violation to intervene (based on its “constitutional rights”) in Cyprus. Of course, Turkey did not carry out the invasion so as to restore constitutional order, but used this argument to seize, through the second phase of the invasion on August 14, nearly 40% of the island, which has been under occupation since then.
Until the mid-1950s, Cyprus was inhabited by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in a ratio of 80%-20%, along with several smaller communities such as Maronites and Armenians. These populations were mixed, living in the same villages and maintaining smooth relations in general.
The Greek Cypriot movement against colonialism began in 1955. Similar struggles were being waged by many peoples who were part of the British Empire at the time. Globally, Marxists and progressive movements of the time supported these anti-colonial struggles unreservedly and in every possible way. However, supporting the anti-colonial/anti-imperialist struggles of different people does not mean supporting the leadership of such movements.
In Cyprus this struggle was led by EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters), a clandestine guerrilla organization headed by the extreme right-wing Georgios Grivas, a man of Cypriot origin, and former leader of the Organization X in the Greek civil war. Grivas and his organization in Greece had primarily fought against ELAS (Greek Popular Liberation Army) and EAM (National Liberation Front), both controlled by KKE (Greek Communist Party) during the nazi occupation and the consequent civil war.
Grivas was the military leader of the struggle against the British colonialism, while Archbishop Makarios served as its political leader. Thus, the national liberation movement was led by the Church and the extreme right. From its very first proclamation in April 1955, EOKA made clear that its aim was not an independent Cyprus, but to unify the island with Greece (“Enosis” meaning Unification). “Enosis” became the central slogan of the armed struggle. Furthermore, EOKA excluded from this struggle the communists (members of AKEL, hundreds of whom later became targets of EOKA’s murderous actions) and the Turkish Cypriots.
The Turkish Reaction to EOKA
The first reaction to EOKA’s creation and declarations came from Turkey. The pogrom against the Greeks in Istanbul in September 1955 was not an isolated incident, but Turkey’s response to what it perceived as an attempt to turn Cyprus into a Greek island and expel its Turkish Cypriot inhabitants.
Cyprus, the third largest island in the Mediterranean, is very close to Turkey (its coastline is visible to the naked eye) and holds great military and strategic importance. From the point of view of the interests of the Turkish ruling class, there was no way they’d allow Greece to turn Cyprus into a Greek island without responding.
The second reaction was the emergence of nationalist elements within the Turkish Cypriot population. Feeling threatened by the Greek Cypriots’ call for unification with Greece, Turkish Cypriot nationalists raised the need to organize and claim their rights as an ethnic minority on the island. Their response (with support from Turkey) was to create a rival organization to EOKA, called TMT (Turkish Resistance Organisation).
It was an armed, paramilitary organization, as nationalist as EOKA, advocating for the partition of Cyprus, with the slogan “Taksim” (partition). This slogan started to dominate Turkish Cypriot politics in 1956.
These developments did not discourage either Grivas or Makarios and certainly did not displease the British colonialists, who deliberately reinforced the division between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot population. The policy of “divide and rule” is a hallmark of the experienced (and insidious) diplomacy of the British Empire, which had already been ruling the planet for two centuries. The British encouraged the Turkish Cypriot nationalists and Turkey to intervene and claim “what is theirs” on the island.
After the British “Withdrawal”
Eventually, the British were forced to withdraw from Cyprus as a direct occupying power, similar to their withdrawal from many of their colonies at the time. They pulled out most of their troops and relinquished direct control, but maintained economic and political influence over these newly “independent” countries. In Cyprus, they kept two huge military bases and significant influence over the economic and political life.
The 1960 constitution recognized Cyprus as an independent state, but not as a truly unified country. The two communities were to be constituent parts, but with separate powers within the same state. According to the constitution, Britain, Turkey, and Greece would be the guarantor powers of the constitution. This arrangement was sowing the seeds of future division, conflict and war.
The constitution mandated proportional representation of the two communities in the parliament, and the electoral system was adapted accordingly. The same applied to civil servants and security forces. The island was to have a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president, with representatives of both communities having the right to veto decisions made by the other side.
Such a model was not functional, given the fierce nationalist competition between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides, as well as between the interests of the ruling classes of Greece and Turkey.
The Constitution collapses – Armed Intercommunal Conflicts begin
The constitution collapsed in 1963, and by 1964, the first armed intercommunal conflicts erupted. The Greek Cypriot side labeled these conflicts as “a Turkish Cypriot mutiny”, but it was Makarios who initially denounced the Constitution. Amid the clashes, Turkey threatened to invade Cyprus, but the Soviet Union, which was maintaining a friendly relationship with Makarios at the time, thwarted Turkish plans—albeit temporarily. Turkey anticipated and planned for partition, with support or at least tolerance from Britain and the U.S.
A turbulent decade followed, culminating in the 1974 invasion.
During this period, two lines began to emerge within the Greek Cypriot ruling class. One faction supported independence, while the other supported the idea of unification with Greece (Enosis). A part of the Greek Cypriot ruling class recognized that Enosis was a dangerous and unrealistic aspiration, thus shifting towards the demand for Cypriot independence. This shift intensified after the military coup in Greece in 1967. Makarios represented this wing of the ruling class, maintaining a policy of balance between the West and the Soviet Union, unlike the nationalists.
Makarios’ balancing act and his open channels to the Soviet Union led Greek nationalists and extremists (supported by the Greek junta) to despise him, branding him “Castro of the Mediterranean.” However, this characterization was far from reality as Makarios had no connection to the Left.
The Greek Cypriot ruling class increasingly moved towards the idea of independence. In 1967, Grivas, a staunch supporter of the idea of Enosis, was forced to leave Cyprus due to his role in the massacres of Turkish Cypriots in the Kofinou area and subsequent (new) threats of invasion by Turkey. However, in 1971, the Greek junta sent him back to Cyprus, where he founded EOKA B.
EOKA B
EOKA B was very different from the EOKA of 1955. While the original EOKA, despite the reactionary political characteristics of its leadership represented the anti-colonial struggle of the Cypriot people and enjoyed widespread support from the Greek Cypriot population, EOKA B was a far-right terrorist organization. It prepared coups, planted bombs, and assassinated its opponents. The first attempt to assassinate Makarios in 1971 failed by sheer luck. The overwhelming majority of Cypriot society supported the elected President Makarios.
EOKA B could not have carried out the 1974 coup on its own; it lacked both the social and military forces necessary for such an undertaking. The coup relied on the special forces of the Cypriot army, which were under the command of Greek officers – under the directions of the Greek junta. In reality, this was a direct intervention by one of the “guarantor powers” (Greece) while EOKA B played a supporting role.
During the same period of armed terrorist activity by EOKA B, other armed forces were being built up in Cyprus on the side of the “democratic camp.” For instance, there was the “Reserve”, a force of 3,000 well-armed men loyal to Makarios. Additionally, the military militias of EDEK (the Socialist Party of Cyprus, which at the time had an extremely radical left-wing character) were active. These forces had twice thwarted the army’s coup attempts but failed to prevent the third attempt.
Following the 1974 coup, Turkey occupied nearly 40% of Cyprus, creating the “Cyprus problem” as we know it today. What is less well known, is that the invasion was followed by an organized, agreed-upon by both sides, population exchange. The Greek Cypriot side rounded up Turkish Cypriots and sent them to the north, and the same happened in reverse for the Greek Cypriots (those who had not already left during the Turkish invasion). This created a geographical division with almost homogeneous populations. Today, very few Turkish Cypriots remain in the south of Cyprus, and very few Greek Cypriots remain in the north, unlike the many mixed villages that existed in the past.
On the “Barbarity” of the Turks
The Greek narrative that the Turks were solely responsible for mass killings of civilians during the 1974 war is one-sided. Greek Cypriot nationalists committed similar atrocities.
A “classic” pre-1974 example is the village of Kofinou, which was invaded in 1967 by Greek Cypriot special forces under Grivas’ direct command with orders to “not leave even a lame chicken alive”.
During the war, Greek Cypriot fascists indiscriminately killed as many Turkish Cypriot civilians as they could. Mass graves of Turkish Cypriots have been found, containing the entire populations of villages who were executed, including men, women, and children.
Of course, similar brutality was demonstrated by the Turkish occupation troops and Turkish Cypriot nationalists. The more than 1,600 “missing people” are, in fact, not missing but dead, many of them executed after their capture.
Part B: Social and Political Upheavals- The blind alley policies of the Traditional Left
The coup, the war, the displacement of 200,000 refugees, and the huge anger of Greek Cypriot society against the far right nationalists opened a period with revolutionary characteristics in south Cyprus. For about six months, there was no authority genuinely recognized by Greek Cypriot society. The coup government under the ridiculous Nikos Sampson lasted eight days before collapsing. He was replaced by Glafkos Clerides, the President of Parliament, but the main demand of the Cypriot people was the full restoration of democracy with the return of Makarios, who had fled (on July 15) to the British bases and from there to London.
Makarios returned to Cyprus in December 1974. It is estimated that about half the island’s population went to welcome him at the Archbishop’s Palace in Nicosia.
The socialist party EDEK was the only force that called for mobilization, although the EOKA B fascists were still free, defiant, and armed on the streets. EDEK denounced the regime that followed Sampson’s fall as the “post-coup regime” which effectively covered up for the coup plotters (most of whom then joined Clerides’ party, DISY – Democratic Rally). On August 30, Cypriot fascists ambushed Vassos Lyssarides, the leader of EDEK. Although the bullets missed Lyssarides, they killed Doros Loizou, a prominent party member and one of its youth wing (EDEN) leaders. Doros Loizou immediately became a symbol of resistance and revolution. This legacy endures even though today’s EDEK has betrayed the ideals for which Doros and many other fighters sacrificed their lives for, in the 1970s.
In his first speech from the Archdiocese, Makarios offered an “olive branch” (he literally threw an olive branch) to the fascists! He forgave the criminals responsible for the blood bath on the island, and proposed reconciliation and “national unity” so that the Greek Cypriot people could move forward together. For the more militant part of the fighters who had struggled for his return (like the EDEN youth who were at the forefront of the massive rally) the shock was indescribable. The next day, questions began to emerge: “What is happening?”, “Why are the fascist elements in the army and the state machine not being arrested?”, “Where is he taking us?”, “How do we proceed?”.
Makarios’ return marked a turning point—taking the initiative away from the struggling people and gradually returning it to the political leaders. However, this situation unfolded because the left-wing parties of the time, AKEL and EDEK, not only allowed it to happen, but actively sought it out.
EDEK: Catalyst of Developments
1974 marked the year when a previously small party decisively entered Cyprus’s political arena and played an important role in shaping events. This party was the Socialist Party EDEK. At that time, radical socialist parties were emerging in several Southern European countries, such as Greece, Portugal, and Spain. EDEK though, had its unique characteristics. As a response to the armed violence of the fascist-nationalists of EOKA B, EDEK also had armed militias, as mentioned earlier. It also had close ties with the Palestinian resistance and other anti-colonial movements. EDEK members received military training in Palestinian camps in the Middle East, while Palestinian fighters visited the Cypriot mountains to conduct military drills with EDEK’s assistance.
Founded in the late 1960s, in its first period EDEK was a moderate centrist party but quickly moved to the left. This shift was partly due to Cyprus’s specific circumstances, where the armed presence of the fascist EOKA B, supported by the Greek junta, awakened the more militant elements of society. Additionally, major international events such as the Colonial Revolutions (the uprisings in colonized countries against the imperialist metropolises mainly of Britain, France, and the USA), May 1968 in France, the Vietnam War, and the Chilean coup, ect, influenced EDEK. A new generation of youth seeking answers in Marxism saw EDEK as the most suitable platform for their struggle. Thus, the youth of the party, EDEN, acquired very radical left-wing characteristics, with clear references to revolution, socialism and Marxism.
EDEN gained prominence and rapidly grew, since the traditional left party in Cyprus, AKEL, was not meeting the needs of the time.
The Limits of AKEL
AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People) was the first political party founded in Cyprus, in 1926 (initially named the Communist Party of Cyprus), and it initiated the creation of PEO, the first and most significant trade union confederation on the island. AKEL united both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot workers in its ranks and within PEO.
In theory, AKEL could have restrained the rise of nationalism in Cyprus, especially after 1955 when the initiative had shifted towards EOKA. However, it adopted a passive stance, clinging to Makarios, whom it viewed as a “progressive section” of the ruling class. These ideas were far from revolutionary Marxism; instead, the pro-Soviet communist parties internationally had long since adopted Stalinism, which sought alliances with supposedly “progressive” capitalists. The Greek experience of the “national unity” policy of KKE (Communist Party of Greece) after the Nazi occupation, which led to a disaster is a clear example of where these policies led.
AKEL’s Historical Role and Missteps
In 1931, the Communist Party of Cyprus (CCP) played a leading role in the “October” uprising against the British. This was not solely a Greek-Cypriot affair; Turkish-Cypriots also contributed. Following the uprising, the CCP was outlawed, and its members were exiled. In response, the banned CCP founded AKEL in 1941 as a “front”, eventually merging with it.
However, unlike in 1931, AKEL did not take the initiative in 1955. EOKA was given free rein, despite its assassinations of AKEL cadres (Grivas’ EOKA is estimated to have killed over 200 AKEL members, branding them as “traitors”).
Also, instead of developing a dynamic anti-fascist struggle that was demanded during EOKA B’s years, AKEL tail-ended Makarios. It refrained from establishing its own militias, suggesting instead that some of its members join Makarios’ forces – a suggestion that never materialized. In contrast, all the other forces, both Greek and Turkish nationalists, Makarios with his Reserve, and EDEK had armed sections as mentioned above.
These policies created a void that EDEK filled with its militant resistance against EOKA B and the coup itself.
EDEK: From Revolutionary Vanguard to Capitulation and Degeneration
EDEK was at the forefront of post-war movements. The first mass demonstration was the funeral of Doros Loizou. Notably, the second phase of the Turkish invasion began on August 14, and on August 30 there was the attempt to assassinate Vassos Lyssarides, resulting in the death of Doros Loizou. This highlights the priorities and the identity of the nationalist right-wing extremists.
EDEN, the youth wing of EDEK, became a mass militant organization with a particularly strong presence among high school students. It promoted a socialist perspective and closely followed international developments, such as the fall of the dictatorships in Greece and Portugal, Allende’s Chile (despite the Pinochet coup), and the Vietnam War, among countless other movements shaking the planet. EDEN students initiated the formation of the “Doros Loizou Youth” immediately after schools reopened after his death (Doros was a teacher). This youth organization quickly became dominant in schools. Many of the best elements of Cypriot youth, including members of AKEL’s youth wing (EDON), were drawn to EDEK and EDEN.
EDEK’s Initial Success and Subsequent Decline
EDEK’s early success lay in its militant character and socialist orientation. However, over time, the party began to shift away from these principles. This capitulation and degeneration resulted in EDEK moving away from its radical roots, compromising with more moderate and conservative elements. This shift alienated many of its initial supporters, leading to a decline in its influence and effectiveness.
In summary, EDEK’s story is one of initial revolutionary zeal and significant impact, especially in the context of the Cyprus conflict and its aftermath. However, the party’s later capitulation and deviation from its founding principles highlight the challenges faced by revolutionary movements in maintaining their integrity and commitment to their original ideals.
The Decline of EDEK and Its Lessons
The capitulation of Vassos Lyssarides and the EDEK leadership’s alignment with Makarios after his return marked a significant turning point for the party. This shift, coupled with the constant right-wing trajectory of the party’s leadership, halted EDEK’s upward momentum and ushered in a period of internal conflict. Despite this, the left wing within EDEK remained strong, exerting considerable influence through its control of the party’s youth wing and its appeal in provincial and grassroots organizations. The Limassol provincial organization (the second largest in the island), in particular, aligned with the left.
The EDEK bureaucracy’s efforts to consolidate control and steer the party towards a more traditional social-democratic, right-wing stance, led to the systematic purging of its left-wing elements. The first expulsions occurred in 1980, targeting the youth leadership and the Limassol provincial leadership, and the purges continued for years.
The bureaucracy’s attempts to reshape EDEK into a conventional social-democratic party effectively led to its destruction. Today, EDEK has reached an appalling nadir, collaborating with ELAM (National People’s Front – the affiliate of Greece’s Golden Dawn), the neo-fascist descendants of EOKA B, who were responsible for the murder of EDEK’s own members. The party’s endorsement of a “Grivas Museum” epitomizes its complete degeneration.
The internal conflict within EDEK mirrored broader international conflicts within the Left of the time. About one decade later, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the restoration of capitalism in 1990-91 plunged the international Left, including its more radical currents, into a prolonged period of decline from which it is still trying to recover.
The late 1970s imparted two critical lessons. First, an organization can rapidly gain mass support if it stays attuned to societal needs and provides leadership to social struggles, as demonstrated by EDEK at its height. Second, the ideological debates and struggles within EDEK, particularly within its youth wing EDEN, equipped a generation of militants with a class analysis of the Cyprus issue. This analysis remains alive within several anti-capitalist left organizations today.
Part C: Why the Problem Remains Unsolved- What Can the Anti-Capitalist Left Do?
If the past 50 years since the Turkish invasion have shown anything, it is that capitalism cannot solve the Cyprus problem. Despite numerous attempts and discussions about a solution, countless UN resolutions, there is nothing on the horizon indicating a positive outcome.
In theory, this does not rule out the possibility of an agreement, between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides, at some point. Whether such an agreement will be a solution, however, is another matter. Agreements between ruling classes with competing interests are often unstable and temporary. They change the character of a problem, but do not solve it. One example of this is Ireland. With the Good Friday Agreement some 25 years ago (signed in 1998, implemented in 1999), it was thought that the problem had been solved. The truth is that it was not. The division remained and even worsened, and the conflicts returned. The domestic political scene is still dominated by the Catholic-Protestant conflict, and the future may hold greater instability if Catholics seek to impose union with Southern Ireland since they are the majority of the population in Northern Ireland already.
In the case of Cyprus, there are not only the conflicts within Cyprus, but also the confrontation between Greece and Turkey, which is far from diminishing over time. This means that though an “agreement” cannot be ruled out at some point, it will not be a real solution to the problem. The problem will continue to exist in one form or another, with the risk of new adventures and conflicts.
Conflict of Interests
The reasons preventing the two sides from reaching an agreement, stem from the real conflict of interests between the two ruling classes on the island, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ones, as well as the mainland Greek and Turkish ruling classes.
The Greek Cypriot ruling class is very strong compared to the Turkish Cypriot ruling class. The Greek Cypriot capital includes multinationals spread all over the world, with a significant presence in the Middle East, the Balkans, and even China. This capital would certainly like to see a solution to the Cyprus issue, i.e., an end to the division, unification of the island, and a single government to run it. But on one condition: that it controls the government so that it serves its interests, as is the case in all capitalist states.
This is the crux of the differences. If the Greek Cypriot ruling class cannot control the central government on the island in a possible future “solution”, why should it bother to seek for it? It would be forced to constantly make compromises and concessions to the Turkish Cypriot side without getting the necessary benefits, i.e., among other things, without being able to economically “invade” and essentially take over, economically, north Cyprus.
On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot ruling class is too small, weak, totally dependent on the Turkish state and unable to compete with the Greek Cypriot capitalists. Therefore, a reunification solution that would allow the free movement of capital, people, goods, etc., would enable Greek Cypriot capital to completely displace the Turkish Cypriot capitalists, thus diminishing their power in north Cyprus.
Therefore, it is not in the interest of the Turkish Cypriot ruling class to accept a solution that would completely unify the island. It could only accept a solution in which the northern part of the island is controlled by itself. But this is something the Greek Cypriot ruling class does not want and has no reason to accept.
This is the economic background to the political contradictions. Let’s complete the picture with the rising nationalism that has been growing on the Greek Cypriot side in the last 2-3 decades. It is important to remember that the Greek Cypriot parliament is building statues and museums for the despicable criminal Grivas, while in the last European elections of June 2024, the neo-fascist ELAM came third (after DISY and AKEL) with 11.2% of the vote. Let’s also consider the developments on the Turkish Cypriot side, as after the 2020 elections, the nationalist, pro-partition (two-state solution) Ersin Tatar won against the center-left Mustafa Akinci.
In this matrix, we must also include the interests of the Turkish and Greek ruling classes, which, as already mentioned, are in fierce competition with each other. Turkey did not occupy 40% of the island by war only to hand it over to the Greek and Greek Cypriot ruling classes.
For decades, the Greek and Greek Cypriot sides have hidden behind the so-called “Turkish intransigence” to mask the real conflict of interests that defines the nature of the Cyprus issue. They could constantly talk about the need for a solution, the implementation of UN resolutions, peace on the island, etc., knowing that the Turkish side would not accept any of these. This bluff was exposed in the Crans-Montana negotiations in 2017, when the deal finally stumbled on the refusal of the Greek side.
Illusions and Lies
Over the past two decades, the Greek Cypriot capitalists have cultivated a series of illusions about the potential for a solution to the problem. One of them was that if Cyprus joined the EU, it would put pressure on Turkey and the regime in north Cyprus to accept a settlement along the lines that the Greek and Greek Cypriot side wanted. This –as everyone now knows– never happened.
Another illusion was that the discovery and exploitation of natural gas in the area would force the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot side to recognize the supremacy of the Greek Cypriot side and accept a solution based on its interests. This did not happen either. In fact, the opposite occurred. When the exploration for gas reserves started, Turkey sent warships to chase away the exploration ships that were representing the interests of French and Italian energy companies, which were eventually forced to retreat in order to avoid a conflict. Turkey then sent its own ships to carry out its own surveys.
Can they not, or do they not want?
These kinds of illusions have collapsed, and today the Greek Cypriot ruling class seems to be moving in a different direction. It is no longer that they “cannot” solve the Cyprus issue, in the sense that they cannot find a solution that suits them, but there are enough indications that they do not actually want to solve it. They do not see a reason to seek a solution, and in this way they identify themselves with the positions of the nationalists.
The Greek Cypriot capitalists basically believe that they are powerful and rich enough and do not need north Cyprus. They seem to prefer to consolidate the island’s partition without saying so openly and certainly without recognizing the Turkish Cypriot state, which would grant it rights.
The last failed attempt to solve the Cyprus issue was in 2016-17, which ended in a fiasco at the meeting in Crans-Montana (Switzerland) in 2017. It was the first time that UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres indirectly blamed the Greek side and not Turkey for the failure of the talks. AKEL (also indirectly) did the same.
It was also the first time that a large percentage of Cypriot public opinion (which cannot accurately be measured objectively) blamed the Greek Cypriots and the Greek side for the failure of the negotiations and not “Turkish intransigence.”
Who Can Solve the Problem?
Since the ruling classes cannot solve the problem within the framework of the capitalist system, the question is, “who can?”. Despite the fact that the ruling classes are in conflict, the working-class people and the oppressed, objectively, have nothing to divide, they have no reason to fight each other.
The conditions for a solution to the Cyprus issue can only be created by the working classes on both sides of the divide, through initiatives from below, with mobilization of the working class and the poor, with grassroots committees, with joint committees of the inhabitants of different towns and villages, with joint actions, rallies and demonstrations.
But mobilizations and actions from below cannot impose a solution if the ruling classes do not want it. At best, they can impose a temporary agreement that will be unstable and will collapse in the future, through new conflicts that will emerge. This is why it is necessary to link those initiatives with the struggle to create new Left forces that go beyond the traditional one — militant, radical, revolutionary mass left formations, that will claim power from the ruling class.
In this way, the foundations can be laid for a socialist federation on the island, allowing the two communities to live in peace and isolating the nationalists on both sides who will surely try to provoke new bloodsheds.
Lessons from 2004
One of the most important lessons from the recent history of Cyprus is the power of the mass movement as revealed during the Turkish Cypriot uprising in 2004. In an unprecedented social explosion, Turkish Cypriots took to the streets, en masse, demanding a solution to the Cyprus problem, based on the proposals made at the time by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. A solution to the problem was never arrived at – the Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos was the one to refuse Annan’s proposals this time.
Nevertheless, the revolt of the Turkish Cypriots forced both the Greek and Turkish rulers to open the previously closed and impenetrable border that divided the two sides of the island.
Since then, there has been the possibility of contact, communication, and joint actions between progressive, left-wing forces and movements from both communities, which are trying to lay the foundations for a future solution to the problem of separation.
Political Equality Between the Two Communities
The working classes can find a way out of the labyrinth of the Cyprus issue, because they do not have conflicting interests. Of course, there is mistrust due to the decades of separation and conflict, and therefore it is necessary to recognize the right of self-determination for the minority, i.e., the Turkish Cypriots.
This means that it would be a mistake to insist (as many in the Left do) on a “one-state” solution. Such a move would, in practice, transform the Turkish Cypriots into a minority within the common state—essentially a return to the past that created the conditions for the current separation. It would be wrong to expect the Turkish Cypriots to accept this.
Therefore, a future workers state for the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot working classes and youth, should be federal, in the sense that the Turkish Cypriots would not have to answer to a government in which the Greek Cypriots would have the upper hand. This is the concept of political equality of the two communities, regardless of the size of one or the other, that the Left must hold high on its banner, if it really wants to overcome suspicions and have peace on a stable and permanent basis in Cyprus.
Once this is solved, i.e., the question of “power”, which prevents the representatives of the capitalists from finding a solution, the rest (territorial issues, the right of refugees to return, property rights, etc.) are practical matters that can be resolved with the necessary patience and relevant work.
Socialist Federation
A federation as a solution is therefore possible, provided that the representatives of the capitalists are out of the way and power has been transferred to the working class. For this to happen, of course, mass workers’ and left parties must be built.
Today, a solution of a “socialist federation” for Cyprus (and for Greece and Turkey) may seem very far away and unrealistic, but this has not always been the case. In the 70s, 80s, and part of the 90s, it was a proposal adopted by large sections of the population. For significant parts of society, it was a common belief that only the Left could solve the Cyprus problem.
Since then, a lot of water has run under the bridges: the retreat of socialist ideas, particularly enhanced by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990; the emergence of new left parties like SYRIZA, which capitulated and implemented policies demanded by international and local capital; and the rise to governmental power of the Left in Cyprus, both AKEL in the south and CTP (Republican Turkish Party) in the north, without it managing to take a single step towards a solution. All of these had a significant impact on consciousness.
Today, the traditional Left is very much discredited in the eyes of the people, and it is not possible for anyone to believe that it can solve the Cyprus issue. This is one of the reasons why we see ELAM at 11.2%.
Opportunities for the Anti-Capitalist Left
The nationalist governments on both sides of the divide are constantly trying to impose difficulties on the contact between the two communities despite the opening of the border between south and north Cyprus. However, the potential for communication and coordination between the progressive forces is much greater now that the borders have been opened than before.
Joint rallies and marches of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, joint events, solidarity actions, and joint committees in various cases are a frequent phenomenon, although they do not yet have the necessary numbers.
These activities create a positive basis. However, they cannot gain real momentum because there is no mass left forces to provide for it, by setting the goal of anti-capitalist subversion and socialist transformation.
The image of the mass left on the island, AKEL in southern Cyprus and CTP in northern Cyprus, is a complete dead end, and there is a huge vacuum on the left of the political spectrum. It is in this vacuum, that the forces of the serious anti-capitalist left on both sides must intervene with a clear, unambiguous aim: to rebuild the Left in both the south and the north on a truly left-wing, revolutionary foundation.
